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Abstract—This paper investigates the security at the physical
layer in cooperative wireless networks (CWNs) where the data
transmission between nodes can be realised via either direct
transmission (DT) or relaying transmission (RT) schemes. In-
spired by the concept of physical-layer network coding (PNC),
a secure PNC-based modify-and-forward (SPMF) is developed
to cope with the imperfect shared knowledge of the message
modification between relay and destination in the conventional
modify-and-forward (MF). In this paper, we first derive the
secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the SPMF scheme, which
is shown to be a general expression for deriving the SOP of any
MF schemes. By comparing the SOPs of various schemes, the
usage of the relay is shown to be not always necessary and even
causes a poorer performance depending on target secrecy rate
and quality of channel links. To this extent, we then propose an
opportunistic secure transmission protocol to minimise the SOP
of the CWNs. In particular, an optimisation problem is developed
in which secrecy rate thresholds (SRTs) are determined to find an
optimal scheme among various DT and RT schemes for achieving
the lowest SOP. Furthermore, the conditions for the existence of
SRTs are derived with respect to various channel conditions to
determine if the relay could be relied on in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security at the physical layer has attracted the interest
of broader communications societies [1]–[3], especially in
cooperative wireless networks (CWNs). In CWNs, the data
transmission from a source node to a destination node can be
realised with the assistance of a single or multiple relay nodes.
Therefore, in order to protect data from vulnerable attacks in
CWNs, the security of both direct and relaying links need to
be considered.
Various secure relaying transmission (RT) strategies were
investigated in [4]–[7]. Specifically, secure amplify-and-
forward and decode-and-forward cooperation schemes were
analysed in [4], [5]. Modify-and-forward (MF) cooperation
scheme was proposed in [6], [7] where the relay first modifies
the message received from the source and then forwards the
modified message to the destination. With MF scheme, it is
shown that an improved secrecy outage probability is achieved
in comparison with the counterparts using other relaying
techniques.
In [6], the modification operation at the relay is assumed to
be inherently shared between legitimate users and thus only
the interested destination can recover the original message.
However, over the wireless media in practice, the channel
dedicated for sharing knowledge between the relay and desti-
nation also suffers from fading and background noise, which
may cause performance degradation. Inspired by the concept
of physical-layer network coding (PNC), a secure PNC-based
MF (SPMF) was then proposed in [7] to cope with the
practical security issue of the imperfect shared knowledge of
the message modification between the relay and the destination
in the conventional MF scheme. With SPMF scheme, such
assumption of perfect shared information is relaxed, while only
channel statistics are assumed to be known at the destination.
However, the performance of the SPMF scheme as well as its
effectiveness compared to other schemes were only validated
through the simulation results.
In this paper, we first derive the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) of the SPMF scheme. A detailed analysis is provided to
verify the effectiveness of the SPMF in comparison with the
direct transmission (DT) [8] and MF [6]. The derived SOP of
the SPMF is shown to be a general expression which can be
used to derive the SOP of the MF scheme in [6] as a special
case. Additionally, the SPMF scheme is shown to achieve a
lower SOP for higher security compared to the MF scheme
in the scenario of imperfect shared knowledge of message
modification between the relay and destination, while the DT
scheme achieves a better performance than both RT schemes,
i.e. MF and SPMF, at a high target secrecy rate. This means
the usage of relay node is not always beneficial, especially
when the link between the source and the relay and/or the
link between the relay and the destination suffer(s) from severe
fading and noise. This accordingly motivates us to investigate
the conditions of the link quality when the relay should be used
in the RT schemes to provide a higher secure communication.
As a second contribution of this paper, we propose an
opportunistic secure transmission protocol for CWNs. The
proposed protocol aims at finding an optimal scheme among
DT and RT schemes that achieves the lowest SOP. It is shown
that there exist secrecy rate thresholds (SRTs) which are the
crossing points between the SOPs of various schemes. The
optimisation problem is thus turned into finding the SRTs with
respect to various channel conditions. Particularly, in order to
verify the existence of the SRTs, we derive the conditions
of the channel quality which not only facilitate the finding
of the optimal scheme for a secure CWN, but also help in
determining if the relay could be relied on in practical CWNs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 illustrates the system model of a CWN under
investigation consisting of a source node S, a destination node
Fig. 1: System model of a CWN in the presence of an
eavesdropper.
D and a relay node R in the presence of an eavesdropper node
E . A half-duplex single-antenna system is considered where
each node is equipped with a single antenna and can either
transmit or receive data, but not simultaneously. It is assumed
that there exists a direct link S → D and thus S may transmit
a data packet to D either with or without the assistance of R.
In Fig. 1, E is assumed to be located between S and D and
in the vicinity of R. Therefore, there exists two wiretap links
from both S and R to E .
In the DT scheme, S transmits data directly to D, while
in the RT scheme, the cooperative data transmission from S
to D is realised via two time slots as follows: i) Time slot
1: S transmits the data packet to both R and D and ii) Time
slot 2: R processes the data packet received from S prior to
forwarding the processed data to D.
The communication channel between A and B, {A,B} ∈
{S,R, E ,D}, A 6= B, is assumed to experience identical and
independently distributed (i.i.d.) quasi-static Rayleigh flat fad-
ing hAB which is time-invariant over the whole transmission
of a data packet and vary independently in the next data packet.
The instantaneous and average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of
the link A → B are denoted by γAB and γ¯AB, respectively.
The probability density function (pdf) and cumulative density
function (cdf) of a random variable X are denoted by fX(·)
and FX(·), respectively.
III. SPMF SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the data transmission, decoding
and encryption process in a general MF scheme, i.e. SPMF
scheme, for enhancing the security of a two-hop CWN.
In the first time slot, S transmits a data packet x to both R
and D. Over the eavesdropper channel, E also receives the data
packet from S. The received signal at node X , X ∈ {R,D, E},
is given by
r
(1)
X =
√
ΛShSXx + n
(1)
X , (1)
where ΛS is the power of the source S and n(1)X is an
independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
noise vector at node X with each entry having zero mean and
variance of σ20 . Then, X decodes the data from S, which is
denoted by x¯(1)X .
In the second time slot, after decoding the data packet
received from S, the relay node R linearly combines the
decoded data, i.e. x¯(1)R , with the encrypted key (denoted by
k) using the PNC approach as follows:
x
(2)
R = αx¯
(1)
R + βk, (2)
where α and β are random PNC coefficients satisfying α2 +
β2 = 1.
Through the second hop, D is expected to receive the data
from R; however, E could overhear the same information. The
received signal at node Y , Y ∈ {D, E}, is given by
r
(2)
Y =
√
ΛRhRYx
(2)
R + n
(2)
Y , (3)
where ΛR is the power of the relay R and n(2)Y is a CSCG
noise vector at node Y with each entry having zero mean and
variance of σ20 . Substituting (2) into (3), we obtain
r
(2)
Y =
√
ΛRhRYαx¯
(1)
R +
√
ΛRhRYβk + n
(2)
Y . (4)
As the PNC coefficients and encrypted key are unknown
to the eavesdropper, it is assumed that E does not attempt to
decode the data overheard in the second time slot, but only
decodes the data in the first time slot as x¯(1)E . Meanwhile, D
is able to decode the data in both time slots as x¯(1)D and x¯
(2)
D
if the information of α, β and k is perfectly shared between
R and D. In the case of imperfectly shared information at D,
maximum likelihood detection can be used given the known
channel statistics of the link R → D.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive the SOP of the SPMF scheme
for CWN.1 The SOP of the DT scheme and the MF scheme
are also provided for comparison. The SOP is defined as the
probability that the wireless system fails to achieve a target
secrecy rate [4], i.e.
Pout , Pr{Cs < Rs}, (5)
where Rs > 0 is the target secrecy rate and Cs is the
instantaneous secrecy capacity. Here, Cs can be computed by
Cs = max{Cd − Ce, 0}, (6)
where Cd and Ce are the instantaneous channel capacity of the
data links to D and the eavesdropping links to E , respectively.
A. SPMF Scheme
Following the same approach as in [7], the maximum rate
for reliable communications of relaying link S → R → D
can be expressed by
Cd=min
{
1
2
log2(1+γSR),
1
2
log2(1+γSD + γ
′
RD)
}
, (7)
where γSR and γSD denote the instantaneous SNR of the
link S → R and S → D, respectively, in the first time slot,
and γ′RD denotes the instantaneous signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) of the link R → D in the second time slot.
Here, the instantaneous SNR γSR and γSD can be computed
from (1) as
γSR =
ΛS |hSR|2
σ20
, (8)
1It is noted that only simulation results were shown in [7] due to page
constraint, while in this paper, detailed analysis is provided to verify the
effectiveness of the SPMF scheme as well as motivating us to propose an
opportunistic relaying protocol in Section V.
γSD =
ΛS |hSD|2
σ20
. (9)
In the second time slot, D receives the combined data from
R consisting of both the interested information and encrypted
key. From (4), γ′RD can be determined by
γ′RD =
ΛR|hRD|2α2
ΛR|hRD|2β2 + σ20
. (10)
Over the eavesdropper channel, the maximum rate for
reliable eavesdropping at E is given by
Ce =
1
2
log2(1 + γSE), (11)
where γSE is given by
γSE =
ΛS |hSE |2
σ20
. (12)
Substituting (7) and (11) into (6) and (5), we have
P
(SPMF )
out =Pr{max{ log2(1+min{γSR, γSD+γ′RD})
− log2(1 + γSE), 0} < 2Rs}.
(13)
In order to derive (13), let us firstly find the pdf of γSR,
γSD, γ′RD and γSE (see (8), (9), (10) and (12)). Since the
links between nodes are assumed to be experienced Rayleigh
flat fading, the pdf of the SNR γAB, AB ∈ {SR,SD,SE} is
given by [9]
fγAB(γAB) =
1
γ¯AB
exp
(
−γAB
γ¯AB
)
, (14)
while the pdf of the SINR γ′RD can be obtained using the
following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If X = c|Z|2, where c is a positive constant, Z is
a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance
of 1, and Y =
a2X
b2X + 1
, where a2 + b2 = 1 and a > b > 0,
then the pdf of Y is given by
fY (y) =
a2
c(a2 − b2y)2 exp
[
− y
c(a2 − b2y)
]
. (15)
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Lemma 1, the pdf of γ′RD can be expressed by
fγ′RD (γRD)=
α2
γ¯RD(α2−β2γRD)2 exp
[ −γRD
γ¯RD(α2−β2γRD)
]
.
(16)
Remark 1 (General pdf function of SINR γ′RD). It can be
observed that, when α = 1 and β = 0, (16) is simplified to
be the pdf of the SNR of Rayleigh fading channel with no
interference (see (14)), i.e.
fγRD (γRD) =
1
γ¯RD
exp
(
−γRD
γ¯RD
)
. (17)
This accordingly reflects the novelty of our work in the SOP
analysis with respect to the conventional MF scheme in [6],
which is a special case of our proposed SPMF.
Further derivation of (13) leads to the following finding:
Theorem 1. The SOP of the proposed SPMF scheme is
obtained by (18) (see the top of next page), where
fX(x) =
1
γ¯SR
exp
(
− x
γ¯SR
)
, (19)
fY (y) =
1
γ¯SD
exp
(
− y
γ¯SD
)
, (20)
fZ(z) =
α2
γ¯RD(α2 − β2z)2 exp
(
− z
γ¯RD(α2 − β2z)
)
, (21)
fW (w) =
1
γ¯SE
exp
(
− w
γ¯SE
)
. (22)
Proof. See Appendix B.
B. DT Scheme
In DT scheme, the relay is assumed to be unavailable and
thus, for fair comparison, S sends the encoded data to D using
the power of 2ΛS . The SOP of the DT is given by [8]
P
(DT )
out = 1−
γ¯SD
γ¯SD + 2Rs γ¯SE
exp
(
1− 2Rs
2γ¯SD
)
. (23)
C. MF Scheme
In MF scheme, R decodes the source message and then
forwards the modified message to D [6]. As the message
difference is assumed to be perfectly shared between R and
D, D can decode the message while E cannot. The MF scheme
is a special case of the SPMF scheme when α = 1 and β = 0,
and thus the SOP of the MF scheme, i.e. P (MF−perfect)out , can
be computed by (24) as in the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For the special case α = 1 and β = 0, the SOP
of the SPMF scheme is given by
P
(SPMF )
out = P
(MF−perfect)
out = 1−
Φ(γ¯RD)− Φ(γ¯SD)
γ¯RD − γ¯SD , (24)
where
Φ(x) ,
(
1 +
x
γ¯SR
)
e(1−2
2Rs )(γ¯−1SR+x
−1)
×
(
1
γ¯−1SR + x−1
− 1
2−2Rs γ¯−1SE + γ¯
−1
SR + x−1
)
.
(25)
Proof. The proof can be obtained from (18) where the pdf of
γRD in (21) is replaced by (17).
Remark 2 (SOP of MF Scheme with Imperfect Knowledge of
Shared Information). In the MF-imperfect scheme,2 the PNC-
based modification process at R, i.e. α and β, are not known
at D. In this case, D simply supposes that α = β = 1/√2.
The SOP of the MF-imperfect scheme is therefore given by
P
(MF−imperfect)
out = Pr{max{min{
1
2
log2(1 + γSR),
1
2
log2(1+γSD+γ
′′
RD)}−
1
2
log2(1 + γSE), 0}<Rs},
(26)
where γ′′RD is determined by (10) when α = β = 1/
√
2, i.e.
γ′′RD =
ΛR|hRD|2/2
ΛR|hRD|2/2 + σ20
. (27)
Accordingly, P (MF−imperfect)out can be obtained as in Theorem
1 using (18) with α = β = 1/
√
2.
2For brevity, the MF schemes with perfect and imperfect knowledge of
shared information are denoted as MF-perfect and MF-imperfect, respectively.
P
(SPMF )
out =
∫ 22Rs−1
0
fX(x)
∫ x
0
fY (y)
∫ ∞
x−y
fZ(z)dzdydx
+
∫ ∞
22Rs−1
fX(x)
∫ x
2−2Rs (1+x)−1
fW (w)
∫ x
0
fY (y)
∫ ∞
x−y
fZ(z)dzdydwdx
+
∫ 22Rs−1
0
fY (y)
∫ 22Rs−1−y
0
fZ(z)
∫ ∞
y+z
fX(x)dxdzdy
+
∫ 22Rs−1
0
fY (y)
∫ ∞
22Rs−1−y
fZ(z)
∫ ∞
2−2Rs (1+y+z)−1
fW (w)
∫ ∞
y+z
fX(x)dxdwdzdy (18)
V. OPPORTUNISTIC SECURE MF PROTOCOL FOR CWNS
Intuitively, the usage of relay may be unnecessary unless the
link between source and relay and the link between relay and
destination do not suffer from severe fading and noise. This
accordingly raises a research problem to find out when the
relay should be used to provide a higher secure communication
over the DT scheme. Inspired by that fact, we introduce the
following optimisation problem
min
X∈{DT,MF,SPMF}
P
(X)
out . (28)
The optimisation problem in (28) aims at finding an optimal
scheme among DT, MF and SPMF schemes that achieves the
lowest SOP.
As shown later in the numerical results, there exists a
crossing point between the SOP of DT scheme and that of RT
scheme. Therefore, in order to solve (28), it is necessary to
find the conditions of the crossing point between SOP curves
of the DT and RT schemes. Let us first introduce the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. Given two non-negative increasing functions
f(x) and g(x) with
df(x)
dx
>
dg(x)
dx
> 0, then ∃!x′ > 0 :
f(x′) = g(x′) iff f(0) < g(0).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 1 is helpful in determining the existence of
the crossing points between various SOP curves as in the
following Theorem 2. For simplicity in the analysis, let us
consider DT and MF-perfect scheme.
Theorem 2. On the subject of target secrecy rate, i.e. Rs,
if γ¯SDγ¯SE < γ¯2SR, γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯SE/2 and γ¯SD <√
γ¯SRγ¯RD/2, then there exists a single crossing point of two
SOP curves for the DT and RT schemes. That is ∃!R′s > 0 :
P
(DT )
out (R
′
s) = P
(RT )
out (R
′
s)
Proof. See Appendix D.
For convenience, let Ωcross denote the set of conditions for
the crossover of DT and RT schemes in Theorem 2, i.e.
Ωcross = {γ¯SDγ¯SE < γ¯2SR ∧ γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯SE/2
∧ γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯RD/2}.
(29)
We have the following observation:
Remark 3 (Existence of a Secrecy Rate Threshold (SRT)
for Opportunistic Secure RT Protocol). From Theorem 2, if
the channel quality satisfies the condition set Ωcross in (29),
then there exists a SRT, i.e. Rth, which is the crossing point
between the SOPs of DT and RT schemes. Specifically, it can
be deduced that{
P
(DT )
out (Rs) > P
(RT )
out (Rs) if Rs < Rth
P
(DT )
out (Rs) ≤ P (RT )out (Rs) if Rs ≥ Rth
(30)
This accordingly means that we should select the RT scheme
for a lower SOP if the target secrecy rate is smaller than the
SRT, while the DT scheme is preferable to achieve a higher
target secrecy rate. Also, notice that if the SRT does not
exist, i.e. the condition set Ωcross is not satisfied, then the
DT scheme should be selected as P (DT )out (Rs) < P
(RT )
out (Rs).
Therefore, given Ωcross, solving the optimisation problem
(28) is turned into finding SRT between DT and RT schemes,
i.e.
Rth = Rs|P (DT )out (Rs) = P (RT )out (Rs). (31)
Using the derived SOPs of various schemes in Section IV, Rth
can be found via a simple numerical method and the optimal
scheme can be opportunistically determined as in Remark 3.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first show the SOP achieved with various
schemes in CWN to verify the analytical findings in Section
IV. We then present the findings of SRTs for determining the
opportunistic secure communication protocol under different
scenarios of wireless channel link quality. The results are
obtained with MATLAB under different scenarios of the
wireless channel quality and the target secrecy rate.
A. SOP of DT & RT Schemes
Figure 2 plots the SOP of various schemes as a function of
the target secrecy rate, i.e. Rs. Four schemes are considered for
comparison, including DT [8], MF-perfect [6], MF-imperfect
and our proposed SPMF. The SNRs of all links are set as
γ¯SR = 20 dB, γ¯RD = 20 dB, γ¯SD = 10 dB, γ¯RE = 15
dB and γ¯SE = 5 dB. The PNC coefficients are arbitrarily set
as α = 3β. In Fig. 2, as noticed in the proof of Theorem
2, it can be seen that the SOP increases with Rs and the
gradient of the SOP of the RT schemes is higher than that of
the DT scheme. The SPMF scheme is shown to achieve an
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Fig. 2: SOP versus target secrecy rate.
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Fig. 3: SRT of various RT schemes versus γ¯SR.
improved SOP performance than the MF-imperfect scheme,
while the DT scheme achieves a better performance at high
Rs, i.e. when Rs > 0.9 b/s/Hz. This accordingly verifies the
statement in Remark 3 regarding the existence of the SRTs.
Additionally, the numerical and analytical results in Section
IV are shown to be consistent with the simulation results.
B. Impacts of Source-Relay Link on SRT
Considering the impact of the link S → R on determining
SRT for opportunistic secure communication protocol, Fig. 3
plots the SRT, i.e. Rth, of three RT schemes, including MF-
perfect, MF-imperfect and SPMF, as a function of the average
SNR of the link S → R, i.e. γ¯SR. The range of γ¯SR is
assumed to be from 10 to 30 dB. The SNRs of other channel
links are set as γ¯SD = 10 dB, γ¯RD = 20 dB, γ¯SE = 5 dB and
γ¯RE = 15 dB. It can be observed in Fig. 3 that Rth = 0 when
γ¯SR ≤ 10 dB. In fact, when γ¯SR is too low, the condition
set in Theorem 2, i.e. Ωcross in (29), is not satisfied, and thus
there do not exist any crossing points between the SOP curves
of the DT scheme and other schemes. This accordingly means
that the DT scheme is optimal in the low-SNR regime of the
link S → R (see Remark 3). It can also be observed in Fig. 3
that Rth increases as γ¯SR increases.
C. Impact of Relay-Destination Link on SRT
The impact of the link R → D on SRT is shown in Fig. 4
where Rth of three RT schemes, including MF-perfect, MF-
imperfect and SPMF, is plotted versus γ¯RD. The range of
γ¯RD is assumed to be from 10 to 20 dB, while the SNRs of
other channel links are set as γ¯SR = 20 dB, γ¯SD = 10 dB,
γ¯SE = 5 dB and γ¯RE = 15 dB. It can be observed in Fig. 4
that Rth = 0 as γ¯RD ≤ −6 dB and Rth increases with γ¯RD.
Similar to Fig. 3, this confirms the existence of SRTs at certain
range of the SNR of the link R → D satisfying the condition
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Fig. 4: SRT of various RT schemes versus γ¯RD.
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Fig. 5: SRT of various RT schemes versus γ¯SD.
set Ωcross (see (29)) as noted in Theorem 2 and Remark 3,
while the DT scheme is beneficial in the low-SNR regime of
relaying links.
D. Impact of Source-Destination Link on SRT
Taking into account the direct link S → D, Fig. 5 plots
Rth of various RT schemes as a function of γ¯SD. The range
of γ¯SD is assumed to vary from 0 to 22 dB to represent various
scenarios of the direct link. The SNRs of other channel links
are set as γ¯SR = 20 dB, γ¯RD = 20 dB, γ¯SE = 5 dB and
γ¯RE = 15 dB. Different from Figs. 3 and 4, it can be observed
in Fig. 5 that the increase of γ¯SD results in a lower Rth and
such decrease approaches 0 as γ¯SD ≥ 20 dB. In fact, it can
be intuitively seen that, if the direct link is of high quality,
then the DT scheme is more beneficial than the RT schemes
with a lower SOP. This accordingly results in the decrease of
Rth. Especially, when γ¯SD ≥ 20 dB, the condition set Ωcross
is not satisfied, and hence, as noticed in Remark 3, the DT
scheme is optimal in the high-SNR regime of the direct link.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have derived the SOP of SPMF scheme
in CWN. The derived expression is a general form of both
the SPMF and the conventional MF scheme either with or
without knowledge of shared information between relay and
destination. The SPMF scheme is shown to provide higher se-
curity compared to the MF scheme with imperfect knowledge
of shared information, while a better performance is achieved
with the DT scheme at high target secrecy rate. Furthermore,
we have proposed an opportunistic secure MF protocol by
finding the SRTs for determining the optimal scheme with or
without the assistance of the relay. Depending on the quality
of channel links, the conditions for the existence of the SRTs
have been derived. It is shown that the SRTs increase as the
SNR of either source-relay or relay-destination link increases,
while the increase of the SNR of source-destination link results
in lower SRTs.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Given a2 + b2 = 1 and a > b > 0, the cdf of Y can be
computed by
FY (y) = Pr{Y 6 y} = Pr
{
X 6 y
a2 − b2y
}
(32)
Note that the cdf of X is given by
FX(x) = 1− exp
(
−x
c
)
, (33)
From (32) and (33), we have
FY (y) = FX
(
y
a2 − b2y
)
= 1−exp
(
− y
c(a2 − b2y)
)
(34)
Taking differentiation of (34) w.r.t y, we can obtain (15).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For brevity, let X = γSR, Y = γSD, Z = γRD and W =
γSE . We can rewrite (13) as
P
(SPMF )
out = Pr{max{log2(1 + min{X,Y + Z})
− log2(1 +W ), 0} < 2Rs}.
(35)
It can be seen that P (SPMF )out = 1 if W > min{X,Y + Z}.
However, such scenario is counter-intuitive in our considered
system model aiming at providing secured communications.
Therefore, let us analyse P (SPMF )out for the scenario W 6
min{X,Y + Z}. From (35), we have
P
(SPMF )
out = P1 + P2, (36)
where
P1 , Pr{2−2Rs(1 +X)− 1 < W}Pr{X 6 Y + Z}, (37)
P2 , Pr{2−2Rs(1+Y +Z)−1 < W}Pr{X > Y +Z}. (38)
It can be observed that, if X 6 min{Y, 22Rs − 1}, then
Pr{2−2Rs(1 +X)− 1 < W} = 1 and Pr{X 6 Y + Z} = 1
since W > 0 and Z > 0. Also, if Y +Z 6 min{X, 22Rs−1},
then Pr{2−2Rs(1 + Y + Z) − 1 < W} = 1 and Pr{X >
Y +Z} = 1 since W > 0. Deriving P1 and P2, we can obtain
(18). The Theorem is proved.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From df(x)dx >
dg(x)
dx > 0, there exist x1 > 0 and x2 > 0:
f(x1)− f(0)
x1
>
g(x2)− g(0)
x2
. (39)
If f(0) < g(0), then there exists a crossing point x′ = x1 =
x2 > 0 such that f(x′) = g(x′) and thus (f(x′)−f(0))/x′ >
(g(x′)− g(0))/x′ satisfying (39). Conversely, if there exists a
crossing point x′ = x1 = x2 > 0 satisfying (39), then we can
easily deduce that f(0) < g(0).
Proof of uniqueness: Let us assume that there exists 0 <
x′′ 6= x′ satisfying f(x′′) = g(x′′) and f(x′) = g(x′). We
can easily see that it contradicts the fact that
df(x)
dx
>
dg(x)
dx
.
Therefore, ∃!x′>0:f(x′)=g(x′) if and only if f(0)<g(0).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
As Rs → 0, from (23) we have
P
(DT )
out →
γ¯SE
γ¯SD + γ¯SE
, P (DT )0 . (40)
In the RT protocol, as Rs → 0, Φ(x) in (25) approaches
Φ(x)→ x
2γ¯SR
xγ¯SR + xγ¯SE + γ¯SRγ¯SE
. (41)
Substituting (41) into (24), we can easily obtain P (RT )0 as
Rs → 0. Denote ∆ = P (RT )0 − P (DT )0 . Solving ∆ < 0, after
some mathematical manipulations, we have
∆ < 0⇔ γ¯SR[γ¯RD(γ¯2SD − γ¯SRγ¯SE/2) + γ¯SE
×(γ¯2SD−γ¯SRγ¯RD/2)]+γ¯SDγ¯RD(γ¯SDγ¯SE−γ¯2SR)<0.
(42)
It can be seen that, if γ¯SDγ¯SE < γ¯2SR, γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯SE/2
and γ¯SD <
√
γ¯SRγ¯RD/2, then ∆ < 0, i.e. P
(RT )
0 <
P
(DT )
0 . Additionally, as in the conventional relaying scheme,
the gradient of the SOP performance of the RT scheme is
higher than that of the DT scheme and the SOP of both
schemes increases as a function of the target secrecy rate, i.e.
dP
(RT )
out
dRs
>
dP
(DT )
out
dRs
> 0. Therefore, from Proposition 1, we
can conclude that ∃!R′s > 0 : P (DT )out (R′s) = P (RT )out (R′s).
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